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This Article reviews international law developments in 2016 in the field of
international procurement.

I.

Bidders Beware: Updates in Canadian Procurement Law

Developments in Canada's procurement landscape in the past year have
imposed significant new requirements on bidders, but have also created new
procurement opportunities by opening new markets and allowing bid
challenges of previously exempt procurements.

A.

NEW

REQUIREMENTS FOR BIDDERS UNDER THE

INTEGRITY

REGIME

On April 4, 2016, Public Works and Government Services Canada
(PWGSC) introduced changes to its Integrity Regime (Regime), which is
made up of the Ineligibility and Suspension Policy and associated integrity
provisions, and are incorporated into Canadian federal solicitations,
contracts, and leases.' The Regime came into force in summer 2015 to
replace 2012's federal Integrity Framework.
Pursuant to the Regime, suppliers who have been convicted of, or who
have pleaded guilty to, certain offences become ineligible to bid on
government contracts, either indefinitely or for ten years, depending on the
offence. Suppliers can also become ineligible as a result of the actions of
* Martin G. Masse and Erin Brown of Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP authored
Section I entitled "Bidders Beware: Updates in Canadian Procurement Law." Samuel W. Jack,
an Attorney Advisor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), authored
Section II entitled "Social Impact Bonds: An Emerging Public Financing Mechanism." Mr.

Jack also served as the editor of the International Procurement Committee's Year in Review for
2016. Steven D. Tibbets, Managing Senior Counsel with CA Technologies, authored Section
III entitled "Evolving Country of Origin Rules for Software could have Significant
Consequences for U.S. Government Vendors." Daniel Carey Brown and Kristina Dahmann
authored Section IV entitled "Advanced Biofuels: American and Japanese Perspectives," and
recently completed concurrent clerkships with the Honorable Algenon Marbley and the
Honorable Michael H. Watson of the Southern District of Ohio, respectively. The views of the
authors are not attributable to their law firms, companies, or government agencies. The article
covers developments during 2016.
1. See PUBLIC WORKS AND GoVERNMENT SERVICES CANADA, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA S
INTEGRiy REGIME (2016), available at http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/ci-if-eng.htnl
[hereinafter Update to Integrity Regime].
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subcontractors or of affiliates they control. Additionally, PWGSC has
considerable discretion to suspend suppliers who have been charged with or
have admitted guilt to certain offences.
However, a number of remedies exist for suppliers. Cooperative suppliers
may see their ten-year periods of ineligibility reduced to five years; suppliers
may have the option of entering an administrative agreement to gain relief
from ineligibility; and the Government may invoke the public interest
exception to do business with suppliers who would otherwise be ineligible.2
The April 4, 2016 changes to the Regime include the requirement that
bidders disclose all foreign criminal charges and convictions, as well as antiavoidance provisions. The updated disclosure requirement mandates that
bidders, as part of their bid, provide "a complete list of all foreign criminal
charges and convictions that may be similar to the Canadian offences listed
in the Ineligibility and Suspension Policy pertaining to itself, its affiliates and
its proposed first tier subcontractors."3 When submitting bids, bidders will
have to certify that they have provided a list of all foreign criminal charges
and convictions. A supplier that provides a false or misleading certification,
including one that is false or misleading with respect to foreign criminal
charges and convictions, will become automatically ineligible to bid on
government contracts.4
In terms of anti-avoidance, under the revised Regime, mergers,
acquisitions, divestitures, spin-offs, and other successions and corporate
reorganizations may not be used to circumvent ineligibility or suspension.
Where the purpose or result of a corporate restructuring or succession is to
avoid an ineligibility or suspension determination, PWGSC has the
discretion to determine that the successor entity is also ineligible or
suspended.5

B.

ENTRY INTO THE

TRADE

CANADA-EU

COMPREHENSIVE EcONOMIC

AGREEMENT

Canada's entry into the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement
(CETA) with the European Union on October 30, 2016, presents exciting
new opportunities for both Canadian and EU businesses. CETA's
procurement chapter covers a wide range of contracting entities and includes
2. See id. (updating Supply Manual §§ 4.21.1., 4.22.1, among other changes).
3. See id; see also PUBLIC WORKS

AND

GOVERNMENT

SERVICES

CANADA,

INTEGRITY

DECLARATION FORM (Apr. 4, 2016) available at http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.ge.calci-if/declarationeng.html. The obligation to disclose charges, convictions and other circumstances is ongoing.

See PULIc WORKS AND GOVERNMENT SERVICES CANADA, INELIGIBILITY AND SUSPENSION
Poiucy at § 17(c), (Apr. 4, 2016), available at http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/politiquepolicy-eng.html [hereinafter Ineligibility and Suspension Policy].
4. See Update to Integrity Regime, supra note 1.

5. See Ineligibility and Suspension Policy, supra note 3, at § 10
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commitments to ensure that procurement is transparent, accountable,
impartial, and non-discriminatory.6
Under CETA, EU companies will be able to bid on Canadian
procurement contracts, including at the municipal level, where the value of
procurement is understood to significantly exceed that of the federal
government. Given that the EU's government procurement market is
estimated at approximately $3.3 trillion annually,7 CETA also creates
significant opportunities for Canadian companies to supply goods and
services to a wide range of EU government contracting entities.8
These landmark procurement obligations are expected to be provisionally

applied as early as spring 2017.
C.

SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ExEMPTION

The last year also saw a narrowing in the scope of the National Security
Exemption (NSE), which the Government of Canada routinely relies on to
avoid the bid challenge mechanism that is typically available to potential
suppliers in other competitive procurements.
In its August 2016 decision in MD Charlton Co. Ltd.,9 the Canadian
International Trade Tribunal (CITT) determined that PWGSC violated the
Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) by failing to tailor the scope of the
NSE. Charlton involved PWGSC's procurement of night-vision binoculars
on behalf of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the end-user of
the binoculars. The RCMP had indicated that, as a matter of national
security, technical specifications could not be disclosed. However, when
PWGSC invoked the NSE, it applied a blanket exemption to the solicitation
from all disciplines of the trade agreements. Rather than making the request
for standing offer publicly available, PWGSC sent it to a pre-determined list
of three potential bidders.
In response to the complainant's allegation that the NSE was improperly
invoked, the CITT determined that, since the non-disclosure of technical
specifications would have sufficed, the purchaser provided no rationale for
the blanket exemption. The CITT ultimately held that while trade
agreements like the AIT allow government institutions to take any action
they consider necessary to protect national security, the NSE cannot be
invoked to automatically and completely remove solicitations from the
purview of trade agreements without further scrutiny.
6. GoVERNMENT OF CANADA, CHAPTER SUMMARIES, available at http://www.international
.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/
2
chapter-surmmary-resume-chapitre.aspx?lang=eng#a 0.
7. Id.
8. The specific government entities that are subject to the Agreement's procurement
obligations are set out in annexes. See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic And Trade Agreement,
Can.-E.U., available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf.
9. (May 13, 2016), PR-2016-007 (CITT).
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CONCLUSION

While the last year has ushered in new requirements for suppliers to
remain eligible to bid on Canadian government contracts, it has also seen an
ambitious new trade agreement with a landmark procurement chapter.
Additionally, the scope of the NSE exemption has been narrowed. Overall,
these developments should create new opportunities for suppliers in the
Canadian marketplace.

II. Social Impact Bonds: An Emerging Public Financing
Mechanism
In the last few years, social impact bonds have emerged as a means of
accessing private capital to finance preventative solutions to pervasive, public
social problems.o This private sector financing arrangement is based on the
principle of "pay-for-success," whereby a government pays a third party
based on the achievement of pre-defined performance targets. Given the
ubiquity of shrinking budgets and political gridlock in the United States and
many European countries, this financing instrument is likely to continue to
grow in popularity. By unlocking private capital and focusing on resultsoriented approaches, social impact bonds could improve the effectiveness of
social programs. The social impact bond model and similar funding
instruments also have the potential to become useful tools for international
development. However, the long-term success of the model will depend on
governments' ability to devise social impact programs that are susceptible to
rigorous measurement and quantifiable results.
A.

How

IT WORKs

A common social impact bond structure is shown in Figure 1 below and
involves the following steps: (1) private sector investors-often
philanthropic organizations or sustainability funds of commercial lenderslend money to finance the up-front costs and working capital for the
program; (2) a project manager-often a non-profit organization-contracts
with the relevant government entity, receives the funding from the investors,
and manages the service provider; (3) the service provider provides direct
services to the recipients utilizing operating funds provided by the project
manager; (4) independent evaluators measure the performance outcomes
achieved by the service provider against the pre-established performance
targets; (5) depending on the extent to which the performance targets are
met, the government pays the project manager based on an agreed upon
formula; and (6) assuming the project manager receives payment from the
10. From a public finance perspective, social impact bonds are not "bonds" because they do
not entail the issuance of public debt. Although these arrangements are more accurately

characterized as a series of contracts, the term "social impact bond" has been popularized
because the structure entails a government payment to a private financier. To avoid confusion,
social impact bonds are often described as a form of "pay-for-success" contract.
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government, the project manager repays the investors, potentially including
interest.

GOVERNMENT
ENTITY

PRIVATE
SECTOR

5. Payment based on
outcomes

1. Financing

Project Manager
6. Repay principal
and return
2. Performance management
and financing
4. Performance
assessment

SERVICE
PROVIDER
3. Service delivery

SOCIAL
OUTCOMES

BENEFICIARIES
OF SOCIAL
SRIE
SERVICES
FIGURE

1

At the center of this arrangement is typically a tripartite contract between
the government entity, the project manager, and the service provider." This
agreement will establish the services to be performed and the performance
targets; funding levels; oversight and reporting obligations; applicable
statutory provisions; the formula for calculating success payments; as well as
standard legal provisions, including the representations and warranties of the
parties, remedies, and liability provisions.1 2 Although the lenders may not be
a party to the agreement-they typically finance the project through
separate financing instruments-lenders may participate in the project's
oversight committee and may be entitled to certain consent rights that are
established in the tripartite agreement. The government entity will also
separately contract with the independent evaluator to assess the achievement
of project goals. As noted below, there are many potential variations on this
11. See, e.g., Pay for Success Contract among the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Roca, Inc., and
Youth Services Inc. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/final-payforsuccesscontractexecuted_1_7_2013.pdf.

12. See id.
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structure, and the parties may change the order in which the transaction
steps occur to suit their circumstances.

B.

ADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL

There are many potential benefits of the social impact bond financing
arrangement. Most immediately, the model fills a gap by connecting private
capital with service providers to address public needs, which can be
particularly attractive to cash-strapped government entities. Although these
services (arguably) should be financed with state or local tax dollars,
governments are often unable to identify the necessary up-front funding or
face other legal and political hurdles to directly financing such projects. The
social impact bond arrangement allows the government to address an unmet
need without incurring debt. In addition, because-unlike under standard
government contracting methods-the government is only required to pay
for successful outcomes, its risk is minimized. This risk transfer allows
governments to experiment with new approaches to social services without
jeopardizing limited tax dollars.
Importantly, the provision of preventative services allows the government
to achieve long-term savings by mitigating the need for costly, mitigation
measures. Modern governments tend to be reactionary in responding to
social problems--even if policymakers recognize a community challenge,
the government may not have the resources to effectively address the
problem. Tight budgets, institutional limitations, and legal constraints often
result in governments treating the symptoms of these problems, not the
causes. As a result, governments invest in mitigation measures-be they
homeless shelters, emergency medical services, or prisons-even if it would
be far less expensive to address the underlying social issues.
The other parties to the agreement also stand to gain. For the investors,
social impact bonds can be an attractive means of fulfilling a charitable
mission and, depending on the success of the program, earning a modest
return on investment. Most importantly, the public gains because this
instrument can provide social outcomes that improve communities and
reduce the need for follow-on interventions.

C.

GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES

The first social impact bond in the United States was implemented by the
City of New York on August 2, 2012.13 The program, known as the
Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE) program, was designed
to provide education, training, and counseling to approximately 3,000 young
men incarcerated at the Rikers Island prison, with the goal of reducing the
13. Stu Loeser & Samanthat Levine, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor Gibbs and Corrections
Commissioner Schriro Announce Nation's First Social Impact Bond Program, Crry or NEW YORK

(Aug. 2, 2012), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/285-12/mayor-bloombergdeputy-mayor-gibbs-corrections-commissioner-schriro-nation-s-first#/0.
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likelihood of recidivism.'4 The agreement called for Goldman Sachs to
provide a $9.6 million loan to MDRC, a nonprofit education and social
that oversaw the ABLE project
policy research organization
implementation. 5 Goldman Sachs was to receive its capital back only if the
prison readmission rate-measured in total jail days avoided-was reduced
by 10 percent or more.1 6 Under the loan terms, if the reduction exceeded 11
percent, Goldman Sachs became eligible for a financial return between
$500,000 and $2.1 million, depending on rate of reduction.7
The ABLE program was ultimately discontinued in August 2015 after
achieving mixed results. The Vera Institute of Justice, which provided the
independent evaluation of the program, reported that it did not lead to a
reduction in recidivism, and the program did not meet the target required
for the city to repay the investors.'s Goldman Sachs ultimately loaned $7.2
million to MDRC, of which $6 million was guaranteed by Bloomberg
Philanthropies.9 Having failed to meet the 10 percent threshold necessary
to trigger the city's repayment obligation, Goldman Sachs took a $12
million loss. Despite this result, advocates for social impact bonds have
argued that the financing arrangement "worked as it was supposed to"20
because the city (and its taxpayers) did not pay for a program that did not
produce the desired results.21
14. Id.

15. See CITY OF NEW YORK, FACT SHEET: TiE NYC ABLE PROJECT FOR
(2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/htmlom/pdf/2012/sib-fact
_sheet.pdf. The program also benefited from a $7.2 million grant from Bloomberg
Philanthropies, the charity of former Mayor Michael Bloomberg, which guaranteed a portion of
Goldman Sachs's loan and thereby reduced its risk.
16. Id.
17. Id; see also Donald Cohen & Jennifer Zelnick, What We Learned from the Failure of the
Rikers Island Social Impact Bond, NONFROFIT QUARTERLY (Aug. 7, 2015), https://nonprofit
quarterly.org/2015/08/07/what-we-learned-from-the-failure-of-the-rikers-island-social-impact
-bond/.
INCARCERATED YOUTH

18. VERA INSTrTUTE OF JUSTICE, IMPACT EVALUATION oF TI-mE Ai)OLFESCENT BEHAVIORAL
LEARNING ExPERIENCE (ABLE) PROGRAM AT RIKERS ISLAND (July 2015) available at https://

www.vera.org/publications/impact-evaluation-of-the-adolescent-behavioral-learning-experien
ce-able-program-at-rikers-island.

19. See Paul Burton, No Success Like Failure: N.Y See Social Impact Bond Pluses, TI-IE BOND
Guly 2, 2015), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/ny-city-officials-socialimpact-bond-big-plus-1077971-1.html.
BUYER

20. See MDRC, MDRC STATEMENT ON TIE VERA INSTITUTE'S STUDY OF ADoLESCENT
BEHAVIORAL LEARNING ExPERIENCE (ABLE) PROGRAM AT RIKERS ISLAND (July 2015),
available at http://www.mdrc.org/news/announcement/mdrc-statement-vera-institute-s-studyadolescent-behavioral-learning-experience; see also James Anderson & Andrea Phillips, Op-Ed:
What We Learnedfrom the Nation's First Social Impact Bond, HuFFrNGTON POST (July 2, 2015),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-anderson/what-we-learned-from-the-_1_b_7710272
.htnl.
21. By contrast, under a traditional government procurement approach, the city would have
been required to pay the service providers pursuant to the contract terms, regardless of whether
the program was successful.

Published by SMU Scholar, 2017

7

The Year in Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2017], Art. 15
230

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 51

Building on New York's experience with the ABLE program, several
22
jurisdictions have since launched social impact bond programs. By the end
of 2016, "pay-for-success" projects, primarily social impact bonds, had been
launched in eleven states, and local jurisdictions in several other states were
exploring this option.23 Project issue areas include homelessness, child
welfare, criminal justice, early childhood development, behavioral health,
and workforce development, among others.
Among the more notable of these programs was the Massachusetts
Juvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative, which was launched by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in January 2014.24 Like the ABLE
program, Massachusetts addressed recidivism among young, male offenders.
A tripartite agreement was executed on January 7, 2014, between the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Roca, Inc. (the service provider), and
Third Sector Capital Partners (the project manager).25 Several commercial
and philanthropic lenders, including the Goldman Sachs Social Impact Fund
as the senior lender, provided the up-front funding for the services.26 This

was the first time that a state had used a competitive procurement to select
the project manager and services manager under the social impact bond
model.27 As of late 2016, the $27 million that Massachusetts will make
available in "success payments" over the seven-year project is the largest
financial investment of its type. 28 Massachusetts made its first payments
under the program in May 2015.29
Along with the expansion of social impact bonds across the United States
at the state and local levels, the federal government has continued to study
their use. The Office of Management and Budget has encouraged federal
22. Although the ABLE program was a trailblazer in the United States, it involved political
actors, namely Bloomberg Philanthropies, which put it in a unique position to succeed. The
subsequent programs have tested this model under circumstances without similar forces at play.
See Pay for Success U.S. Activity Map, NONPRoFIT FINANcE FUND, http://www.payforsuccess
.org/pay-success-deals-united-states.
23. See id.
24. See FACT SHEET: The MassachusettsJuvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative, NONPROFIT
FINANCE FuND, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/trends-in-our-business/massachu
setts-social-impact-bond/MA-juvenile-justice-pay-for-success-initiative.pdf
25. Third Sector formed a subsidiary supporting organization, Youth Services, Inc., to serve as
the legal entity for performing the project. Id; see also Pay for Success Contract among the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Roca, Inc., and Youth Services Inc., supra note 11.
26. FACT SHEET: The Massachusetts Juvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative, supra note 24.
The U.S. Department of Labor made a "first-of-its-kind" grant of $11.7 million grant to
Massachusetts to make success payments under this agreement. See id.
27. See COMMONWEAITI-I OF MASSACI USEITS, MASSACHUSETTS RFR 2012, available at
http://www.payforsuccess.org/opportunity/massachusetts-rfr-2012.
28. See FACT SHEET: The Massachusetts Juvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative, supra
note 24.
29. See U.S. GovERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PAY FOR SuccEss: COLLABORATION
AMONG

FEDERAL

AGENCIES

FINANCING MECHANISMs,

WOULD

BE

HELPFUL

As GoVERNMENTs

ExPLORE NEW

GAO-15-646 at 13 (Sept. 2015), available at http://www.gao.gov/

assets/680/672363.pdf.
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agencies to explore the use of pay-for-success contracts, including social
impact bonds, "where appropriate," and at least four federal agencies have
awarded pay-for-success grants or are developing such proposals.30
Although there is currently no formal, government-wide program, President
Obama proposed the establishment of a $300 million fund to expand the
federal government's role in supporting state and local pay-for-success
initiatives.)' Members of Congress have also introduced legislation to
expand federal support for these projects.32 Given President Trump's
campaign promise to significantly increase infrastructure spending-relying,
in particular, on "new private infrastructure investments"-it is conceivable
that social impact bonds will play a broader role at the federal level during
his administration.33

D.

USE AS AN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

TOOL

While the popularity of social impact bonds has grown most rapidly in the
United States, the model was first implemented in the United Kingdom and
has since been used in several European countries.34 The social impact bond
model has also been proposed as a new means of providing assistance to
developing countries in service of the world's poorest people. Referred to as
"development impact bonds" in this context, this financing mechanism
operates in largely the same manner, except that the (local) government
35
payor is typically replaced by a foundation or foreign donor government.
In the international development setting in particular, impact bonds have
the potential to be a powerful tool to stimulate public and private donor
organizations that seek a clear link between funding and results. Given the
political scrutiny that foreign assistance faces in many developed countries,
the development bond model can demonstrate aid effectiveness using
quantifiable metrics. This focus on rigorous measurement, and learning
30. See id. at 5.
31. See id. at 2.
32. Id. (citing Social Impact Partnership Act, H.R. 1336, 114th Cong. (2015); Social Impact
Partnership Act, S. 1089, 114th Cong. (2015); Social Impact Bond Act, H.R. 4885, 113th Cong.
(2014); Pay for Performance Act, S. 2691, 113th Cong. (2014)).
33. See Melanie Zanona, Ryan offers picture of public-privatespending in Trump's infrastructure
plan, Tin, HILL (Jan. 19, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/315110-ryan-offerspicmre-of-private-public-spending-in-trumps-infrastructure.

34. See Emma Disley, Chris Giacomantonio, Kristy Kruithof and Megan Sim, The payment by
results Social Impact Bond pilot at HMP Peterborough:finalprocess evaluation report, RAND EUROPrE
REPOWr TO TIlHE U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTrCE, 2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/
486 5
12/social-impact-bond-pilotgovernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/

peterborough-report.pdf.
35. See generally Adva Saldinger, Have development impact bonds moved beyond the hype? DEsvrx
8, 2016), https://www.devex.com/news/have-development-impact-bonds-moved-beyond-

Guly

the-hype-88372.
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from past interventions, also has the potential to provide important "lessons
learned" to the entire international development community.36

E.

THE FuTURE

OF

SOCIA.L

IMPACT

BoNDs

While social impact bonds have grown in popularity in recent years, their
continued growth will depend on overcoming certain challenges. Most
importantly, they require pinpointing outcomes that can be linked to a
service and are susceptible to objective measurement. To date, a small
number of social services have been identified that can attract investor
interest. Many social problems are simply too complex or cannot meet the
need for near-term results. Although the risk-shifting that is inherent in this
mechanism is beneficial to governments, private sector investors may lack
mandates to provide social impact funding. As a result, many commercial
investors are unwilling to take the financial risk in exchange for a minimal
return on investment.
In addition, at the outset of a project it can be challenging to draft
requirements and evaluation methodologies that will adequately gauge the
effectiveness of the services, particularly when the services are innovative
and previously untested. The lack of properly-defined requirements can
create ambiguity or inconsistent results, even if the services are otherwise
successfully implemented. It can also be costly and labor-intensive to
negotiate and draft the large number of agreements that constitute a social
impact bond. It can take months, if not years, to properly develop and
structure the necessary business arrangements. As a result, the process
requires considerable resolve and commitment from all sides to reach a final
agreement.
Despite these challenges, social impact bonds offer an attractive financing
option for government services. By sustaining a focus on performance and
preventative services, social impact bonds may lead to significant advances in
how these services are delivered and measured. While they may not be
appropriate for all projects, it is likely that-as more projects are
implemented-the cumulative results will provide a better model for what
works.

36. Of course, the impact bond model faces additional challenges in the developing world.
Impact bonds are significantly more complex than standard development instruments and the
time and expense of setting up an impact bond may not be justified based on the project scope.
In addition, language barriers and the limited number of actors in the development industry, as
well as political and legal constraints in host countries, pose potential challenges. See A.

Saldinger, supra note 35.
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m.

Evolving Country of Origin Rules for Software Could Have
Significant Consequences for United States Govermnent
Vendors
The U.S. Government purchases approximately $6 billion of software
each year.37 Federal acquisition laws limit government agencies to
purchasing software for which the country of origin is the United States or a
"designated country" under the Trade Agreements Act.38 This rule makes
products originating in certain software-development hotbeds like
Hyderabad, India ineligible for sale to United States government agencies.
However, recent country of origin determinations issued by the United
States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (Customs) have clarified
that the location where code is compiled is the country of origin for
government procurement purposes, regardless of where the code is initially
developed. These determinations provide reasons to believe that software
manufacturers may leverage lower-cost development work in non"designated countries" without jeopardizing access to the United States
government market.39
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) implements a number of
policies and statutes that observe preferences for goods manufactured in the
United States or in countries with which the United States has favorable
trade relations.40 The FAR implements the Buy American Act (BAA), which
establishes a preference for domestic items, i.e., items for which the country
of origin is the United States. Federal agencies must purchase only domestic
products unless a BAA exception applies.41
37. See OMB Memorandum M-16-12, Category Management Policy 16-1: Improving the
Acquisition and Management of Common Information Technology: Software Licensing,June 2, 2016, at
1, available at https://www.actiac.org/omb-memorandum-m-16-121-category-managementpolicy- 16-1-improving-acquisition-and-management-common.
38. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2513).
39. Certainly, this assurance could be undermined by further evolution of Customs' country of
origin jurisprudence.
40. See generally 48 C.F.R. pt. 25.
41. See 48 C.F.R. § 25.001(a)(1). The BAA also does not apply if "the contracting officer
determines that the price of the lowest domestic offer is unreasonable." Id. There is also an
exception to BAA requirements for commercial information technology, such as software. 48
C.F.R. § 25.103(e). Ostensibly, if commercial information technology is exempt from the BAA
country of origin restrictions, and the TAA just provides another exception to the BAA, then the
information technology exception would seem to be dispositive - i.e., if a contracting officer is
not required to purchase domestic items, then a rule partially prohibiting discrimination against
non-domestic items would seem not to apply. Contrary to this logic, U.S. Government agencies
universally assume that they may only purchase supplies with a U.S. or "designated country"
origin in procurements covered by the TAA. See Jeffrey A. Belkin & Donald G. Brown, The Buy
American Act information technology exception: Should it apply to the Trade Agreement Act-covered
contracts? 24:6 WESTAW J. Gov'-r CONTRAcr, July 26, 2010, available at http://www.alston
In addition, while TAA requirements
.com/Files/Publication/def44ccb-05d6-4184-8639.
typically do not apply unless the value of a procurement meets a certain threshold-$204,000 as
of late 2016, 48 C.F.R. § 25.402(b)-agencies generally assume smaller purchases are subject to
TAA limitations based on the overall value of the contract vehicles under which they are
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The Trade Agreements Act (TAA) establishes the main exception to the
BAA's domestic item requirement. For procurements that meet specific
minimum dollar value thresholds, agencies may purchase either domestic
items or items with TAA "designated country" of origin and may not
discriminate in favor of domestic items. 42 Practically speaking, commercial
software vendors who wish to sell even a modest volume of products to the
U.S. Government must offer products with TAA-compliant countries of
origin.
In some cases, the country of origin of a product is clear, because it was
manufactured entirely within a particular country. In other cases, where
different parts of the manufacturing process occur in different countries, the
"substantial transformation" test governs the country of origin. Under the
"substantial transformation" test, the country of origin is the location where
the components of an item underwent the change, or the changes, which
caused them to become an end item with a new "name, character, or use."4
Parties that are unsure about a product's country of origin may seek a ruling
from Customs, which has authority to issue binding country of origin rulings
for purposes of U.S. Government procurement contracts.- Recent Customs
rulings on the origin of software have further defined these requirements.
Individual software products are usually developed in multiple
jurisdictions and over a long period of time, as bits and pieces of code are
repurposed for use in new products and cross-border teams of coders work
together to develop and improve products. Prior to 2012, there was very
limited guidance for determining the country of origin of software. In 2012,
however, Customs issued a non-binding advisory ruling on the topic,
identifying seven stages of software development: (1) research; (2)
development of a graphical user interface; (3) development and writing of
software specifications and architecture; (4) programing of source code; (5)
software build; (6) testing and validation; and (7) preparation of the software
for distribution (burning the software onto server media from which it will
be downloaded when purchased).45 Customs explained that the "software
build" is "the process of methodically converting source code files into
standalone lines, routines and subroutines of software object code files into
standalone lines, routines and subroutines of software object code that can
be run by a computer"46 and concluded that the software build substantially
purchased. Id. These factors combine to render wide swaths of software procurements subject
to TAA "designated country" origin restrictions.
42. See 48 C.F.R. § 25.502(b)(1).
43. See 48 C.F.R. § 25.001(c)(2).
44. 19 C.F.R. pt. 177, subpt. B.
45. U.S. CusToMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FINAL DETERMINATION HQ H192146 qune
8, 2012), available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocumentsfTalend.pdf.
46. See generally Daniel S. Lin, Matthew Sag & Ronald S. Laurie, Source Code versus Object
Code: PatentImplicationsfor the Open Source Community, 18 SANTA CLARA HIGH Tcii. L.J. 235,
238 (2002) (Discussing the differences between source code and object code: "Source code has
been described as a computer program written in a high level human readable language. In
contrast, the related object code is the same computer program written in computer readable
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transformed the software into an end item with a different character and use
than its predecessor components. Thus, wherever the "software build"
process occurs is the country of origin, regardless of where the source code
was developed.47
In early 2016, a binding customs ruling further clarified and affirmed a
rule that the location where source code is compiled into object code is the
country of origin. In that case, Customs ruled that source code developed in
Malaysia (not a "designated country" under the TAA) by a Malaysia-based
firm called e-Lock was substantially transformed when it was compiled into
usable object code in the United States.48 The final software product in that
case was a U.S.-origin item, despite the fact that all of the source code was
developed in Malaysia. The e-Lock determination solidified the principle
that compilation of source code into object code constitutes substantial
transformation.
A primary reason companies outsource software development is to reduce
costs. A number of jurisdictions in which software development is especially
affordable, like India and Malaysia, are not "designated countries" under the
TAA. The recent Customs determination concerning e-Lock gives software
vendors greater assurance that they may outsource software development to
non-"designated countries" without jeopardizing their ability to meet
country of origin requirements for United States government contractors.
IV.

Advanced Biofuels: American and Japanese Perspectives

As the earth's temperature continues to rise, with potentially dire
consequences, governments around the world have begun to take steps to
combat climate change. These steps include initiatives to encourage
renewable or alternative energy, both in the form of statutes and regulations,
9
as well as through grants and contracts.- The United States and Japan are
two notable "super economies" that have focused on developing alternative
energy.50 This section will review recent developments in each country's
renewable fuel economy.
format, which is required for the program's execution by a computer. One important difference
between source code and object code is that source code is generally platform-independent,
meaning that it does not refer to the intricacies of any particular type of computer. In contrast,
object code is platform-specific and must necessarily refer to the inner workings of the
particular computer.").
47. U.S. CusToMs AND BoRDER PROTECTION, FINAL DETERMINATION HQ H192146 (June
8, 2012), available athttp://www.steptoe.com/assets/htnldocuments/Talend.pdf.
48. See 81 Fed. Reg. 8733, 8735 (Feb. 22, 2016) (discussing Final Determination HQ
H268858, Feb. 12, 2016).
49. See Collin O'Mara, Climate Prosperity: A New Way of Thinking Forging A Responsible
Environmental Policy Can Offer Big Economic Benefits, Dri,. LAW, Summer 2009, at 14; see also
Peter M. Goodloe, Simplification-A FederalLegislative Perspective, 105 DicK. L. REV. 247 (2001).
50. See Jim Lane, Biofuels Mandates Around the World: 2016, BoFUELsDicEST (Jan. 3, 2006),
http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2016/01/03/biofuels-mandates-around-the-world2016/.

Published by SMU Scholar, 2017

13

The Year in Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2017], Art. 15
236

A.

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 51

ADVANCED BIOFUELS IN THE UNITED STATES

The U.S. Government has expended considerable political energy to
foster the alternative fuel sector and has established a mandate-driven
alternative fuel economy.51 The EPA is required to set an annual standard
(i.e., usage requirement) for cellulosic biofuelSs2 under the Renewable Fuel
Standard if the "projected volume of cellulosic biofuel production is less
than the volume specified in the statute (i.e., the mandate)."53 Under these
standards, there has been a continued increase of mandated cellulosic
biofuels, including a notable jump in fiscal year 2016.54 The system is
dependent on sufficient production of each fuel to meet the mandated
volume requirements, which has been highly problematic.55
To jump-start the production of biofuel, the U.S. Government has
awarded contracts and grants to assist in the development of the industry.
Notably, funding has come from several agencies, including the EPA and the
Department of Agriculture (USDA), as well as the Departments of the Navy,
Transportation, Treasury, and Energy. To encourage cellulosic biofuel
production, the Department of Energy's Loan Guarantee Program,6 the
USDA Biorefinery Renewable Chemical Program, and Biobased
Manufacturing Assistance Program,57 as well as various tax incentives, have
been implemented to assist in the research, development, development and
deployment of cellulosic biofuels.
B.

ADVANCED BIOFUELS IN JAPAN

Like the U.S. Government, the Government of Japan (GOJ) has a keen
interest in developing and promoting alternative energy sources, especially
cellulosic biofuels. During its industrialization after World War II, Japan's
primary energy use shifted from coal to hydrocarbons, which were mostly
51. Energy Independence and Security Act ("the EISA"), Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 201-04,
121 Stat. 1492 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (Supp. II 2008) (the implanting
policies will be referred to as the Renewable Fuel Standard ("RFS")).
52. In the United States, cellulosic biofuels are statutorily defined as a "renewable fuel derived
from any cellulose, hemi-cellulose, or lignin that is derived from renewable biomass and that
has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, as determined by the [Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA)]."

Kelsi

Bracmort,

The

Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): Cellulosic Biofuels,
Report R41106, Aug. 31, 2015, at 6.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARZCT SERVICE,

53. See id. at 5.
54. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2017, and the Biomass-Based Diesel Volume Jbr 2018,
available at www.epa.gov; see also Final Rule: Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for
2017 and Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2018, 40 C.F.R. § 80.1405, amend. 40 C.F.R. pt.
80.
55. See Bracmort, supra note 63, for a comprehensive overview of the changes that have
occurred since EISA's enactment.
56. The program was first created from the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 16513
(2005).
57. See Lynn J. Cunningham, Beth A. Roberts, Bill Canis, and Brent D. Yacobucci, Alternative
Fueland Advanced Vehicle Technology Incentives: A Summary ofFederalPrograms, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERvicE, Report R42566, Jan. 10, 2013, at 20-2 1.
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imported.58 In 2012, Japan was second only to China among the largest net
importers of fossil fuels worldwides9 and, as of November 2016, Japan
needed to import approximately 84 percent of its energy requirements.60
Although nuclear energy production had been a GOJ strategic priority since
1973, seismic forces have rendered nuclear energy an unreliable fuel source.
Nuclear power provided 30 percent of Japan's electricity as of early 2011,
and was projected to provide 40 percent by 2017,61 but consequences of the
March 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami have made for a rocky interim.
As of September 2016, Japan was receiving only 1 percent of its energy from
nuclear power. 62
Cellulosic biofuels, however, are poised to ease Japan's energy burdens
with little to no apparent political cost. Because their sources do not
compete as fiercely with food crops as first-generation biofuels, advanced
biofuels are especially attractive to GOJ. The Japanese public is largely
suspicious of using farmland for energy production,63 as Japan has a dearth of
agricultural and arable land compared to many other industrialized
countries. Based on total calories consumed, Japan now imports
approximately 60 percent of its food annually.64 Unsurprisingly, Japan was
among the first countries to invest in advanced biofuel technology and
production. In 2007, it began operating the first commercial wood-to65
ethanol plant, which had a capacity of 1.4 million liters per year. Japan
remains focused on researching and promoting biofuel sources that do not

58. See VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY TRANSITIONS: HISTORY, REQUIREMENTS, PROSPECTS 93
(Praeger Publishers, 2010)
59. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, TODAY IN ENERGY: JAPAN IS THE
SECOND) LARGEST NET IMPORTER OF FOSSIL FUELS IN THE WORLD (Nov. 7, 2013), available at
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=13711.
60. See WoRu NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, NUCLEAR POWER IN JAPAN, availableat http://www.
world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.as
px.
61. Id.
62. Mayumi Negishi, Japan's Sbift to Renewable Energ Loses Power, TI-IE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Sept. 14, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-shift-to-renewable-energy-losespower-1473818581.
63. See USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, MARKET FOR LIQUID TRANSPORT
BIOFUELS REMAINS STEADY AS JAPAN REMAINS FOCUSED ON ADVANCED FUELS (Aug. 1,
2
2016), available at http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Biofuels% 0An
nualTokyoJapan_8-26-2016.pdf.
64. See USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, JAPAN/TRADE, available at https://www.
ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/countries-regions/japan/trade/.
65. Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 2 1st Century, Renewables 2007: Global Status
Report at 19 (2008), available at http://www.worldwatch.org/files/pdf/renewables2007.pdf.
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compete with food production,66 and Japanese universities and research
institutions are expected to expend significant resources to make advances.67
In Japan, the terms of resource procurements are generally negotiated
between private parties, with the government's role being mainly facilitative.
GOJ's 2014 five-year Strategic Energy Plan envisions the government
becoming even more involved in encouraging private negotiation and
collaboration in this sector, and states as follows:
GOJ needs to improve the environment that enables discussions on
diversification of terms and conditions of transactions, such as the
pricing mechanisms and destination clauses. They also need to support
strategic efforts to procure stable and competitive resources, including
strengthening the bargaining power through the strategic use of new
joint procurement schemes.
Specifically, communications between energy producers and consuming
nations will be facilitated and collaboration between consuming nations
will be strengthened by providing many opportunities for international
dialogue, such as the LNG Producer-Consumer Conference, and
Japan-South Korea Gas Dialogue.68
As GOJ hoped, private actors have engaged in discussions. In July of
2015, the Initiative for Next Generation Aviation Fuels, a consortium of
forty-six organizations (including Boeing, All Nippon Airways, Japan
Airlines, the University of Tokyo, and GOJ), announced a five-year roadmap
to both hasten and increase the use of advanced biofuels in anticipation of
the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games.69 The roadmap
includes a section for future discussion items, including a consideration of
costs, the business promotion framework, issues in business implementation,
and guidance for dispute resolution.70
In conclusion, it is evident that the United States' and Japan's
governments have differing approaches to the development of the renewable
66. USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, MARKET FOR LIQUID TRANSPORT BIOFUELS
REMAINS STEADY AS JAPAN REMAINS FOCUSED ON ADVANCED FUELS (Aug. 1, 2016), available
at http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Biofuels%20AnnualTokyo

Japan_8-26-2016.pdf.
67. Id. Of special interest are algal cellulosic sources for jet fuel. A Tokyo venture firm that
owns a farm in Okinawa hopes to produce as much as 125 million liters of algal biomass-based

jet fuel annually by 2020.
68. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF EcONoMY, TRADE, AND INDUSTRY, STRATEGIC ENERGY PLAN
(Provisional Translation) at 33 (Apr. 2014), available at http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/cate

gory/others/basic-plan/pdf/4th strategic energy-plan.pdf.
69. See The Boeing Company, Boeing, Japanese Aviation Indutry Unveil Biofuel 'Roadmap' to
2020 Olympics, (July 8, 2015), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2015-07-08-Boeing-JapaneseAviation-Industry-Unveil-Biofuel-Roadmap-to-2020-Olympics
(citing Initiatives for Next
Generation Aviation Fuels, Roadmap for Establishing Supply Chainfor Next-GenerationAviation
Fuels, July 2015, available at http://aviation.u-tokyo.ac.jp/inaf/roadmap-en.pdf)

[hereinafter

Roadmap].
70. See Roadmap, supra note 69, at 44-47.
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energy industry. The United States, on one side, has annual mandates that
require production volumes by certain dates, and GOJ, on the other side,
provides no deadlines or definitive numbers, acting merely as an active
observer and facilitator in the economics of the industry. Especially
considering changing political climates, only time will tell which approach
will achieve the best result.71

71. See Steven Mufson, EPA sets new biofuel targets. Troubled program could end up on Trump's
cbopping block, WASi-. Pos-r (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/11/23/epa-sets-new-biofuel-targets-troubled-program-could-end-upon-trumps-chopping-block/?utm term=.fa9bcd8085cf.
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